

Ex#1249

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
and Others) Prepared Statement and Report
- AGAINST -) on Japanese Naval Preparation
) 1931-1941
ARAKI, Sadae)
and Others)

Prepared Statement and Report by Admiral
James O. Richardson, United States Navy, Retired:

1. In response to the request of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 31 May 1946, the Secretary of the Navy on 25 July 1946 designated me to appear as a witness before this Tribunal to present information in regard to documents in the custody of the Navy Department bearing on the questions at issue here.
2. I proceeded to consult official naval reports, records and documents made or kept by officers acting in the course of official duties and in accordance with established naval procedure in investigating, recording and reporting facts which are matters of concern to the United States

Navy. This statement is a report to this Tribunal of my investigation of those records which bear upon the subject of the plans and preparations made by the Japanese Navy leading up to the naval hostilities which Japan initiated and waged on and after 7 December 1941. This subject will be presented under four headings, as follows:

- (1) The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction, particularly construction of aircraft carriers.
- (2) The plans and preparations concerned with the establishment of naval bases and the erection of fortifications in the Mandated Islands.
- (3) The plans and preparations concerned with consular espionage as an aid to naval attack.
- (4) The plans and preparations for secret attack by Japanese aircraft carrier task force upon the United States naval personnel and ships at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, without notification having been given by Japan to the United States by a previous, explicit and reasoned warning that there would be a commencement of hostilities in a war by Japan against the United States.

I..

The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction, particularly construction of aircraft carriers.

3. The aircraft carrier was recognized as early as 1934 by the Japanese naval leaders, Admiral Isoroku YAMAMOTO and Admiral Osami NAGANO to be the best type of naval arm for expansion and aggression. This is shown by the following records of statements made by them.

4. This official Japanese position that aircraft carriers were essentially what they called "offensive" or aggressive naval arms was stated by Admiral YAMAMOTO and by Admiral NAGANO at meetings connected with the London Naval Conference of 1935. YAMAMOTO, who, seven years later, was to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet in the Pearl Harbor aircraft carrier attack, took the position at a meeting of the American and Japanese delegations on 29 October 1934 that Japan should not be suspected of having aggressive designs in the Far East. In supporting this position, YAMAMOTO said that the Japanese, in fact, were willing to abolish aircraft carriers--upon terms which the Japanese would consider satisfactory to

themselves--whereas, he said, "If they (the Japanese) had aggressive designs in the Far East, nothing would be more useful than the retention of aircraft carriers." (IPS Document No. 6250)

5. Admiral NAGANO, the leader of the Japanese delegation in the London Conference, who was soon to become Japanese Navy Minister and later, at the time of the Pearl Harbor aircraft carrier attack, to be the Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at an official session of the London Conference on 15 January 1936, stated again the Japanese view that aircraft carriers were the principal type of aggressive naval arms. NAGANO said, "In order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate****the abolition of aircraft carriers," and a reduction in certain other classes of naval vessels. (IPS Document No. 6251)
6. The official naval leadership and the personal cooperation of NAGANO and YAMAOTO are indicated not only by their joint efforts in connection with

the London Naval Conference, but also by the fact that NAGANO and YAMAMOTO for a considerable period in 1936-1937 served together as Navy Minister and Vice Minister, respectively, and later, in 1941-1943, as Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, respectively, the positions in which they took the lead in working out the plans and in issuing the orders for the Pearl Harbor attack.

7. The records further show that NAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates made the construction and use of aircraft carriers a central principle of Japanese naval policy. The execution of this policy involved three steps: first, the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the removal of the treaty barriers to secrecy in naval construction; second, the construction of aircraft

carriers and supporting naval units until Japan had carrier supremacy over the United States; and third, the use of an aircraft carrier task force for making a secret, sudden attack to destroy before war began the men and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet while the ships were lying at anchor or moorings in Pearl Harbor.

8. The first step, namely the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, was carried out under the naval leadership of YAMAMOTO and NAGANO as Japanese naval representatives attending the meetings connected with the London Naval Conference. The Washington Treaty of 1922 had limited Japan by ratio to a total carrier tonnage of 81,000 tons. The Japanese representatives demanded the abolition of the existing treaty limitations on naval construction. The Japanese demanded in place of the existing ratio or proportional limitations a treaty limitation based on what they called "a common upper limit." The other nations considered that the adoption of the proposal would result in

the abolition of any limitation rather than in the maintenance of any effective limitation.

None of the other nations agreed with the Japanese demands. The Japanese gave notice on 29 December 1934 of their intention to terminate the treaty under its terms to take effect 31 December 1936.

On 16 January 1936, led by Admiral NAGANO, the Japanese withdrew from the conference, refusing to join the other nations in the formulation of a new treaty to limit naval construction.

9. Under the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930, Japan, the United States and Great Britain had been exchanging reports on their naval construction. When not bound by these treaty provisions because of her termination thereof, Japan, in communications which included letters exchanged in 1938 between Foreign Minister HIROTA and Ambassador Grew, rejected American, British, and French proposals for the reciprocal exchange of information on naval construction. Japan, however, continued to obtain extensive information in regard

to naval construction in the United States by methods including the consular espionage which will be described hereafter.

10. As the second step in Japanese naval policy, the Japanese Navy and Government between 1936 and 1941 proceeded with an expanded program of aircraft construction. In 1936, Japan had four carriers, with a tonnage of 68,400 tons. By 7 December 1941, however, only five years later, Japan had more than doubled her carrier strength, having ten carriers, with a tonnage of 178,070 tons.

11. In addition to increases in aircraft carrier construction, Japan, between 1931 and 1941, increased her heavy cruisers from eight in 1931 to eighteen in 1941, destroyers from fifty-two to 102, and submarines from forty-four to seventy-four. During the same period, the United States facing increasing naval responsibilities in two oceans brought its total number of heavy cruisers from ten to eighteen, the same number as Japan,

while the number of destroyers dropped from 225 to 171, and the number of submarines increased from eighty-one to 112. By way of comparison in aircraft carriers, in the years 1934 and 1936, when Admiral YAMAMOTO and Admiral NAGANO, respectively, made the statements at the London Conference as quoted above, the Japanese Navy and the United States Navy each had four aircraft carriers. On 7 December 1941, whereas Japan had ten aircraft carriers, the United States had only six and only three of them were in the Pacific.

12. The third and final step in the execution of the Japanese naval policy with regard to the construction and use of aircraft carriers was the use by Japan of an aircraft carrier task force as the attacking force in the Pearl Harbor attack. The six carriers which the Japanese sent against Pearl Harbor, namely, KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, were the Japanese Navy's most powerful carriers. They constituted 75% of the Japanese Navy's entire carrier tonnage strength, and they sent into the attack 360 planes, constituting

probably 75% of the total Japanese carrier plane strength. The maximum total number of carrier based planes which the United States naval forces could have mustered if the two carriers then in the Hawaiian area, namely the USS LEXINGTON and the USS ENTERPRISE, had been at Pearl Harbor would have been approximately 180 planes. In other words, Japanese naval construction of aircraft carriers between 1936 and 1941 enabled Japan to send against the United States Navy's men and ships at Pearl Harbor one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled up to that time, with overwhelming carrier air force supremacy over the naval forces attacked. Moreover, a principal target and objective of the Japanese Navy in making the attack was to destroy the two United States carriers based at Pearl Harbor, and thereby to increase the already predominant Japanese carrier supremacy in the Pacific.

13. To summarize, Japanese plans and preparations concerned with naval construction between 1931 and 1941 were characterized by the express recognition

by NAGANO and YAMAMOTO, leading Japanese naval authorities, that aircraft carriers were the principal type of naval construction for conducting aggressive naval warfare, and by the termination by Japan of existing treaty limitations on the construction of carriers and other naval arms. Japanese naval plans and preparations, moreover, featured the construction of aircraft carriers until in 1941 Japan had attained decisive supremacy over the United States and other nations in aircraft carriers. And finally, as the climax of her naval policy of expansion and aggression, Japan on 7 December 1941, used an aircraft carrier task force to make a sudden, secret attack designed to annihilate United States naval power in the Pacific before war had actually commenced.

II

The plans and preparations concerned with the establishment of naval bases and the erection of fortifications in the Mandated Islands.

14. Documentary evidence will now be presented which indicates that the Japanese naval policy with respect to the Mandated Islands was characterized by the same objectives as those with respect to the Japanese naval policy on aircraft carriers, namely, to develop and use them for naval expansion and aggression.
15. The execution of this policy likewise was along the same lines of activity as those which were pursued in the execution of the policy with respect to aircraft carriers, namely, (1) the termination, or in this case, the direct violation of treaty limitations, (2) the construction of fortifications and of naval bases in the Islands, and (3) the use of the Islands fortifications and bases in initiating and waging naval hostilities against the United States and her allies on and after 7 December 1941.

16. The treaty and mandate limitations were established (1) by the Treaty of Versailles (1920), (2) by the mandate of the Islands to Japan pursuant to the Treaty and (3) by the Mandates treaty between the United States and Japan (1922). These limitations are stated as follows:

"...no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory" of the Mandated Islands.

17. Numerous documents show that the Japanese Navy and Government established naval bases in the Mandated Islands, but for the sake of brevity and because of its adequacy, only one of them is presented. That document is the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1. (IPS Document No. 17)

18. Admiral YAMAMOTO, as Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet, issued this order from his flagship, the NAGATO, on 5 November 1941. (IPS Document No. 17, p. 2/1)

It was an order that "Combined Fleet Operations in the war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands will be conducted in accordance with the separate volume."

The separate volume, in 151 pages of text, tables and charts, outlines operations for a war beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 2/17, 2/18). It provides for preparations for war, communications, supply, allocation of forces and other details.

19. The Mandated Islands appear in many places in this order. At page 2/67 the order establishes an allotment of supply bases. The supply bases allotted to the South Seas Force and the Advanced Expeditionary Force are the following Mandated Islands: SAIPAN, KWAJALEIN, WOTJE, JALUIT, TAROA, TRUK, PONAPE, and PALAU. These eight bases constitute more than half of the total number of naval supply bases thus allotted, namely a total of fifteen.

20. At pages 2/76 to 2/78 is an Appended Table 1, giving initial fuel allowances for supply bases. The boiler oil allowance to five of the eight Mandated Island bases totals 46,500 metric tons. Likewise allotted to the Mandate bases

are great quantities of aviation fuel, bombs, machine gun ammunition, torpedoes and mines. Rations are allotted for 36,000 persons per month at the eight Mandate bases. Large monthly replenishment allowances are tabulated at pages 2/91 to 2/94. Aircraft material for the South Seas area is to be replenished at TRUK, and submarine material at KWAJALEIN.

21. No doubt Order No. 1 is accurate in applying the term "bases" to these Mandate installations. The materials, the quantities and the areas involved indicate that these naval bases and their equipment for storage, transport, communications, and guns and ammunition had been established on a large scale and over a considerable period of time. Other documents on this point are available for presentation or examination.
22. The Mandated Islands appear in Order No. 1 also in tables of allocations of forces (pages 2/104, 105, 106). The South Seas Force, centering about the 4th Fleet (commonly called the Mandates Fleet) is allocated for rendezvous the South Seas or Mandated Islands. Operating from these bases it is ordered to aid in covering the withdrawal of the Pearl

Harbor striking force, to attack Wake and Guam as quickly as possible, and to cooperate with the striking force "in the occupation of strategic areas." Also based in the Mandates is the Commerce Destruction Unit, apparently submarines assigned by the Order to destroy sea traffic. Japanese submarines of the 6th Fleet and of other fleets regularly used bases in the Mandates. Submarines en route from Japan to Pearl Harbor rendezvoused at Kwajalein.

23. It is clear, therefore, that the Japanese Navy before 7 December 1941 had established naval bases in the Mandated Islands.

24. Likewise many other documents show that the Japanese Navy and Government erected fortifications in the Mandated Islands. For brevity only one set consisting of three documents is presented here. Two of these documents (IPS Documents No. 6254-A and No. 6254-B) are aerial reconnaissance photographs of WOTJE Island taken by United States Navy photographic intelligence units in January 1942, less than two months after war began. The third document (IPS Document No. 6254-C) is a Japanese blueprint map of WOTJE

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dated 10 August 1940 captured by American forces landing at Kwajalein in February 1944.

25. An examination of these photographs shows that WOTJE, before 31 January 1942, had been fortified and equipped as a combination of an island fortress and a naval base. The blueprint map shows that before 10 August 1940 the Japanese Navy and Government had already created extensive fortifications. The magnitude of the Japanese naval installations at WOTJE is indicated by the tables of numbered items attached to each document.
26. The photograph C-23, WOTJE Island, North End, (IPS Document No. 6254-A) shows the center of the Island to be covered by two intersecting paved airfield runways, each 300 feet wide, one more than a mile long (5700 feet), the other 3900 feet long, and suitable for large land-based bombers as well as lesser aircraft. Two (or three) large hangars and two large, shop-type buildings are seen west of the runways.

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North of these hangars is a large seaplane ramp, with a hangar 150 feet wide by perhaps 300 feet long suitable for the largest seaplanes.

27. Many gun positions are seen, including a northern and a southern 3-gun Dual Purpose Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defense Battery each with adjacent power plant, munitions storage, command post and barracks area. The guns are probably 5-inch or 6-inch guns. Numerous blockhouses are observed along the shore in the photographs and map.
28. Storage tanks for heavy oil and structures for ammunition storage are indicated on the Japanese map by lettering and also on the photographs by clouds of black smoke showing where U. S. Navy aviators have located the tanks and ammunition storages.
29. Trenches, pillboxes, machine gun emplacements, wire entanglements, a connecting system of roads, plus a total of more than fifty buildings are also to be observed on the photographs and map.

30. In photograph C-22 (IPS Document No. 6254-B) are shown the large, two-story radio transmitter buildings, flanked by three radio towers, and by other buildings and tanks.

31. The total volume of installations on WOTJE, as shown by this Japanese map dated 10 August 1940 and by these aerial photographs dated 31 January 1942, is sufficient to show that the Japanese Navy and Government had been engaged in establishing the bases and erecting the fortifications at least prior to the middle of 1940 and perhaps at least during the entire year 1940 as well as 1941. I am informed that additional evidence on this point is to be introduced later in another section of this case in the form of statements from residents of the Islands who worked on the construction at WOTJE for the Japanese.

32. It appears that the documents prepared by the Japanese Navy, namely Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, and the Map of WOTJE, are sufficient to show that the Japanese Navy and Government before 7 December 1941 established naval bases and erected fortifications.

III

The plans and preparations concerned with
consular espionage as an aid to naval attack.

33. Numerous documents and records show that the Japanese Navy and Government, particularly the Foreign Office, between 1931 and 1941, were engaged in a policy of surveillance, reconnaissance and espionage with respect to the naval establishment and activities of the United States Navy and Government.

34. The United States Naval Court of Inquiry on the Pearl Harbor Attack stated, in its findings of fact, that Japan's espionage system utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world and enabled her to keep constantly informed of the United States naval building program and of the location and movements of United States naval vessels.

35. An extensive continuous espionage was conducted under the direction of the Japanese Navy and Government, particularly the Foreign Office, at Honolulu, through Consul General

Nagao KITA and his 200 consular agents scattered throughout the Islands.

36. Documents which show the nature and extent of this espionage and particularly its heavy contribution to the Pearl Harbor attack, will now be presented. These documents are authenticated copies of some of the messages exchanged between the Japanese Consul General's office at Honolulu and the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. They were coded messages sent via commercial communication companies. (IPS Documents No. 6255-A,-C,-D,-E,-F,-G,-H and -I)

37. In order that the messages may be understood in their references to places and areas at Pearl Harbor, a chart of Pearl Harbor has been prepared and will now be offered.
(IPS Document No. 6258)

38. The first message (IPS Document No. 6255-A, Japanese message #83) is from Tokyo, apparently from the Foreign Office because it bears the name of Admiral TOYODA, the Foreign Minister. It reads as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those

at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side of same wharf.)

ARMY 23260

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)"

39. The next message (IPS Document No. 6255-C, Japanese message #111) from Tokyo, apparently is another Foreign Office message as it bears the name of Foreign Minister TOGO. It reads as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)"

40. The next message, (IPS Document No. 6255-D, Japanese message #222) illustrates the type of information which the Japanese Consul General was sending to Tokyo less than a month before Pearl Harbor.

It reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 16, 1941

#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

Area A - A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at Docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

Army 25817

Trans. 12/6/41 (2)"

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41. The next message, (IPS Document No. 6255-E, Japanese message #123) raises three important questions preparatory to the Pearl Harbor attack. It likewise bears the name of Foreign Minister TOGO and thereby indicates close liaison between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Navy. It reads as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army
30 December 1941)

J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

(Introduce Kuehn confession.)

42. On the same day as the date of the preceding Japanese message #123, namely 2 December 1941, Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, according to his recorded confession, (IPS Document No. 6256-A and B) which has been presented in evidence, delivered to Consul General KITA and his assistants at his office in Honolulu information and documents as requested by the Consul General. The confession also indicates that Kuehn was paid a considerable sum of money, apparently not less than \$10,000, for his services in providing such information to the Japanese Consul General and therefore in turn to the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. The information and papers delivered by Kuehn, included full details of United States ships present, with their berthing locations in the harbor, and also a comprehensive code of signals by which such information could be communicated to Japanese submarines or other Japanese naval units then en route to Pearl Harbor.

43. The Kuehn code, repeated practically verbatim as Kuehn had delivered it to Consul General KITA, was duly transmitted by KITA to Tokyo by message dated 3

December 1941. The Lanikai Beach House and Kalama House mentioned in the message were houses occupied by Kuehn, according to his confession. This message (IPS Document No. 6255-F, Japanese Message #245) reads as follows:

44. "From: HONOLULU (Kita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941 (Translated by Navy 11 December 1941)
(PA-K2)

#245 (in 2 parts, complete)
(Military secret).

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

<u>Meaning</u>		<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	: Preparing to sortie	: 1
	:	:
	:	:
A number of carriers	: Preparing to sortie	: 2
	: All departed between	:
Battleship divisions	: 1st and 3rd	: 3
	: Several departed	:
Carriers	: between 1st and 3rd	: 4
	: All departed between	:
Carriers	: 1st and 3rd	: 5
	: All departed between	:
Battleship divisions	: 4th and 6th	: 6
	: Several departed	:
Carriers	: between 4th and 6th	: 7
	: All departed between	:
Carriers	: 4th and 6th	: 8

2. Signals.

1. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:

		<u>Signal</u>
One light between 8 and 9 p.m.		1
" " " 9 and 10 p.m.		2
" " " 10 and 11 p.m.		3
" " " 11 and 12 p.m.		4

III.

Two lights	"	12 and 1 a.m.	5
"	"	1 and 2 a.m.	6
"	"	2 and 3 a.m.	7
"	"	3 and 4 a.m.	8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900-2000	3
2000-2100	4
2100-2200	5
2200-2300	6
2300-2400	7
0000-0100	8

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug, etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
from 7-12	3 or 6
from 8-9	4 or 7
from 9-10	5 or 8."

45. In further compliance with the request which had been forwarded under the name of the Foreign Minister, Consul General KITA sent the following messages, which were no doubt relayed in due course to the Japanese Fleet, then closely approaching Pearl Harbor. The message dated 5 December 1941 (IPS Document No. 6255-G, Japanese message #252) reads as follows:

Doc. No. 6257

"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December
1941)
(PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th,
the three battleships mentioned in my message
#239 arrived here. They had been at sea for
eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy
cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port
on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class
and ***** were in dock."

46. A message of 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo
provides direct information for the "surprise attack"
which the message mentions, dealing with the important
subjects of barrage balloons and torpedo nets. This
message, (IPS Document No. 6255-H, Japanese message
#253) reads as follows:

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"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941" (translated by Army 8 December
1941)

PA-K2

#253. Re the last part of your #123.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."

47. On the eve of the attack, the Japanese Consul General sent to Tokyo the following message regarding the ships at anchor and lying at docks in Pearl Harbor. The message is (IPS Document No. 6255-I, Japanese message #254) and it reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were _____ and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

48. The documents on Japanese espionage and reconnaissance which have been presented have been limited to a few of those dealing with consular espionage in Honolulu, because they show that the activities of the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office in planning and conducting this consular espionage as an aid to the Pearl Harbor attack may be classed with their other activities in preparation for aggressive warfare.

IV

The plans and preparations for secret attack by Japanese carrier task force upon the United States naval personnel and ships at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, without notification having been given by Japan to the United States by a previous, explicit and reasoned warning that there would be a commencement of hostilities in a war by Japan against the United States.

50. The plans and preparations made by the Japanese Navy with respect to construction of aircraft carriers and of naval bases and fortifications in the Mandated Islands has been presented. Consideration has also been given to Japanese naval plans and preparations concerned with consular espionage as a preparation for surprise naval attack. The consummation of the foregoing plans in delivering the attack on Pearl Harbor by the use of the aircraft carriers, of the fortified Island bases and of the espionage reports will now be presented.
51. The attack will be considered with respect to (1) its objectives, (2) its plan and (3) its execution.
52. The documents used in this analysis of the attack will be principally (1) the Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1 (IPS Document No. 17); (2) Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Research Report No. 131, Dated 1 December 1945, entitled Japan's

Decision to Fight (IPS Document No. 1628); and
(3) Research Report No. 132, from the same source, hereinafter referred to as ATIS, entitled The Pearl Harbor Operation (IPS Document No. 1627).

53. 1. The objectives of the Pearl Harbor attack have been stated by Admiral NAGANO to be:

"(1) rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the South Seas operation (including the Philippine Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands." (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 66)

The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Admiral ITO said: "This Fleet (at Pearl Harbor) will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities... If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while America is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor." (IPS Document No. 1627, pp. 7, 8)

54. In Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, pages 2/7, 8 (IPS Document No. 17), the general objectives of the entire Japanese operations are stated as follows:

"1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and the American lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.

"2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.

"3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operation will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

"4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

"5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

"6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."

55. 2. The plan of the Pearl Harbor attack, according to NAGANO, was conceived by YAMAMOTO the first part of January, 1941, and was worked out by operations staff officers beginning in September, 1941. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 66) The Japanese naval personnel who knew of the entire plan in

advance included NAGANO and YAMAMOTO, and those who knew part of the plan included Admiral SHIMADA, Navy Minister, and Admiral OKA, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs.

(Id., p. 67) Preparatory to a final formulation of the plan, war games were held at Tokyo on September 2 to 13, 1941, with approximately forty key Japanese Naval officers participating and with NAGANO as the ranking officer in charge acting as umpire. (Id., pp. 4, 5, 6)

56. According to Japanese naval officers who took part in the preparation of the plan, among the problems to be solved were how to attack most effectively the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. They stated:

"It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaii area out of action..."

Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

- (a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.
- (b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

- (c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.
- (d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed."

57. Additional problems were refueling and effecting surprise in the attack. On those points the same officers stated (Id., p. 68): "The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution of the operation would have been impossible." Refueling at sea was dealt with by making it a matter for special training. To insure surprise, the little travelled northern ocean route was to be used, screening destroyers were to be sent ahead, and complete radio silence was to be carried out at sea while deceptive radio activity was to be conducted in the Inland Sea and Kyushu areas.

(Id., p. 68)

58. The plan provided in detail for the organization of a select Task Force, under the command of Admiral NAGUMO, and

made up of 6 aircraft carriers, supported by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 3 submarines and 8 tankers. (Id., p. 83) Additional units included submarines, both regular size and midget submarines manned by specifically trained officers. (Id., p. 78; IPS Document No. 1627, pp. 17-23) Carrier-borne attack airplanes numbered 360, namely, 135 dive bombing planes, 104 horizontal bombing planes, 40 torpedo planes, and 81 strafing planes. Targets assigned were principally aircraft carriers, airbases and grounded airplanes, but in execution battleships received special attention because of the absence of carriers. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 84)

59. The plan provided, also, for lesser forces to operate in various areas. (IPS Document No. 17, pp. 2/104-6).

60. Neither in this plan for the Pearl Harbor attack nor in any other Japanese document among the Navy records have I found any indication that the planners gave any consideration to the applicability or the non-applicability of the Third Hague Convention requiring warning before attack.

61. 3. The execution of the plan. On 5 November 1941, Admiral NAGANO issued an order to Admiral YAMAMOTO (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 75) under which YAMAMOTO on the same date (IPS Document No. 17, p. 2/1) issued Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, putting the plan into effect. On 7 November, YAMAMOTO issued Order No. 2 (Id., p. 2/152) fixing Y-Day for 8 December, in accordance with the provision in the plan for fixing Y-Day, and, later, X-Day (Id., pp. 2, 3).

62. On the same date, 7 November 1941, YAMAMOTO issued from his flagship, the NAGATO, an order which directed the Task Force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay at Etorofu Island in the Kuriles, and to take on supplies until 22 November. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 77)

63. On 25 November, YAMAMOTO ordered the Task Force to move out on 26 November and to "proceed without being detected" to the evening rendezvous point set for 3 December. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 78)

64. On 26 November 1941 at 0600 hours the Task Force moved out on its trip of more than 3000 miles to Pearl Harbor. (Id., p. 78)

65. On 2 December the Task Force under way received a Combined Fleet order stating "X-Day will be 8 December" (7 December Pearl Harbor time). (Id., p. 78)

66. On 2 December, Admiral YAMATO from his flagship, the YAMATO, gave the order to proceed with the attack.

67. On the night of 6-7 December (Pearl Harbor time) the Task Force made the run-in southward at top speed (26 knots).

68. On the early morning of 7 December (Pearl Harbor time) the carriers, when 230 miles due north of Oahu, launched the planes of the First Attack Unit, at 0130 hours, and when 200 miles north of Oahu launched the planes of the Second Attack Unit at 0245 hours. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 71) The planes rendezvoused to the south of the carriers and then flew in to the attack. Torpedo planes and dive bombers attacked from 7:55 to 8:25 A.M. Horizontal bombers were the principal attackers in an attack lasting from 8:40 to 9:15. Dive bombers attacked from 9:15 to 9:45, when the raid ended.

69. The Task Force, after launching its planes withdrew at high speed to the northwest, where the planes, except for approximately 28, returned to the carriers, between 10:30 A.M. and 1:30 P.M. The Task Force then proceeded to Kure, arriving on 23 December.

70. The attackers killed 1,999 officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Navy. Rear Admiral Isaac Campbell Kidd, U.S.N., commander of battleship division #1, was killed, presumably in the explosions aboard his flagship, the USS ARIZONA, where he was last seen in action. All told, the ARIZONA lost 47 officers and 1056 enlisted men. (Navy Department, Chief Naval Personnel, Certif. 15 July 1946). The U. S. Marine Corps suffered casualties of 109 killed. (Marine Corps Director Personnel Certif. 7 May 1946). The U. S. Army lost 234 killed. (War Department Casualty Branch Certif. 8 July 1946). Civilians killed in the attack numbered 54. (War Records Bureau, University of Hawaii, Rept. Spec. Agt. CIC, AFMIDPAC dated 7 June 1946).

71. The United States lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. The United States suffered severe damage to, or loss of,

8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines.

72. The disproportionate extent of losses marks the extent to which NAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates in the Japanese Navy and Government had succeeded in maintaining secrecy and in attaining surprise in their naval plans and preparations between 1931 and 1941, reaching on 7 December 1941 the climax of their successful planning and preparing.

73. By their repeated emphatic warnings in orders and elsewhere that only by complete secrecy and complete surprise could the Pearl Harbor attack succeed, NAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates had succeeded in achieving complete secrecy and complete surprise in the Pearl Harbor attack.

74. I have been unable to find in the records of the United States Government any information regarding any Japanese document or communication by which the Japanese Government gave to the United States a previous, explicit and reasoned

warning that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the United States. A notice from the Japanese Foreign Office announcing that "there has arisen a state of war" between Japan and the United States was received in the Office of the Secretary of State at 2:35 A.M. on 10 December 1941, sixty-six hours and forty minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs from the Japanese carrier planes struck Pearl Harbor.

極東公隊軍事裁判所

(一頁)

亞米利加合衆國其他對其不滿及其他

一九三九年至一九四一年(昭和六年至昭和七年)日本海軍

戰備演習及巡洋艦下水記述並報告

亞米利加合衆國退役海軍大將軍(一九一九年十二月二日)準備

十九陳述並三報告

一九四二年(昭和七年)六月三日聯合總司令官、參

請一九四一年(昭和六年)七月一日海軍大臣

裁判所出頭此處關係事項問題(關心海軍有條件

書類)報告者提示不宣稱指名也。

二、職務進行上亞米利加合衆國海軍關係事項、

事實、調查記錄及之報告於此正視、海軍、半續、軍

士官部製作保管之乙式、海軍報告記錄及之文

書、參照也。

本陳述一九四一年(昭和六年)六月一日及其以後(二頁)

河船之遂行之為海軍作戰(三月)日本海軍、計

劃及準備、問題(關心工記、記錄、本裁判所對

之和、調查、報告)、問題下記、四項目(全)

提交人。 19 RETUR TO ROOM 361

TOP SECRET

Doc 6257

(一) 海軍，建造特三航空母艦，建造二屬之計画及準備
(二) 奉令統治諸島於江海之參謀，建設三要塞，構築
三屬之計画及準備

(四) 信義討日本，戰爭於敵討行爲，給之不外。

明確ニテ理由附之軍事上警戒依ニ日本ヨリ米國へ
通告が期スルモノトナ一九四一年昭和六年二月七日布陸
道勝利於合衆國沿岸守護及監視日本航空
母艦機動部隊が八月六日襲撃三列不許通及準備

第三章 一 論

海軍艦船、建造特一航空母艦、建造二深入計畫及
準備

三、艦首魚雷六枚及三連管，爲「海象」式船，最良之型！」
三、一九四三年／昭和九年／日本海軍着艦者。
山本五十六海軍大將及三永郎修集海軍大將依リ認
メシタ。二事：彼等、詔、下記、記録依リ示せん。

四、航空母艦「本質的」、「彼等、所謂「強勢的」則「優勝的」海軍武器」上、六〇、日本、海張、一九三五年（昭和十年），

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倫敦海軍會議開席，會談，除山本海軍大將並永野
海軍大將，連丸元町，其後之軍事，巡洋艦，航
空母艦攻擊，於日本聯合艦隊司令官上村伊作，日本
一九三四年（昭和九年）十一月十九日，米田公表，會議於
于日本，極東。於平信，點對點，有之，但誤念，實，
今非不重複也。二三張，裏行，山本、日本滿更
之機條件，下三日本、英國、法、空母艦，依然，麾之，（是）
上聲明也。若復有〔日本側〕二三索要侵略，真圖？！
十六七八航空母艦，保持條件，六七九，〔一〕很，
言明也。（〔二〕除條件外，言滿洲事，是）
二、倫敦會議於日本，首席代表，其後日本海軍
大臣，其後巡洋艦，航空母艦攻擊，除日本
海軍司令於長久，永野海軍大將，一九年（昭和十年）
一月十日倫敦會議，之大會議，於上海之航空母
艦，攻擊的海軍武器，主要七形之，日本，重張，
言也。永野，更，侵韓及，濟南，不，能，出來
矣，其全招來也，三等，我之，一、航空母艦，居上，
巡洋艦，他，級，又，減，少，不，喝，導，之

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→ 漢文帝（劉恒）：漢朝第二位皇帝，漢高祖長子。

六、參野上山本：戰勝工連隊統一三個人的協力，偷放海船會議兩公體美、共同努力，解除了不平。又參野上山本（一九三六年—一九三九年）解了三年半，同相當時（一九三九年—一九四一年）海軍大臣（一九三九年—一九四一年）相共三勢力，其後（一九四一年—一九四三年）昭和十六年（一九四一年）三公合令於海長久之解全體隊司令長官（多道珠廣）為總參謀、計畫、立軍事委員會（參野上山本）指揮他，在軍事委員會（明治二十一）。

七、繪記錄係以水野上山本少將所管、駕空母艦、並
且、使用日本海軍之船、主要原則如下。

本政策實施三段階：一、以一艦為航空母艦，建造一層甲板的船體，擴充並
海軍艦隊、艦載機數量、條件之擴張；二、擴充、擴充至三日
本之空襲軍事行動之航空母艦（六隻）
之其艦體擴建這一事、第三、要擴高破浪
又、擴高之空襲軍事行動艦隊、人員及艦艇擴軍
前、級第三等級攻擊機（八架）、航空母艦機動艦隊

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使用文書。

八、第一段階即航空母艦建造問題現行條約制限
參六倫敦懶害會議開之會議日本海軍代表
率出席也。山本及永野、海軍總率下遂行也。
又、一九三一年（大正二十年）華府條約改訂依
日本制限、航空母艦噸數分一个頭也。
日本代表、海軍建造問題現行條約制限、概無
要求也。日本側、現行水平即以此制限、代三級等
所謂「共相對照限度」其干涉條約制限要求也。
但諸國、本提案、採用何等？有制心制限、保持三級
每口如何制限之標準又諸果至甚也？上思考也。
他、諸乞、皆日本側、要求同意也。日本側、一九三四年
昭和九年／十二月二十九日—一九三六年／昭和二年／三月三十日
三、有効化條約上想定之準據、該條約廢棄之意締約
平通告也。一九三六年／昭和二年／一月十六日永野海軍大將
總率、下三日本側公會議、腹退之、諸乞一諸
海軍建設制限不對條約、作廢了也。

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九、一九三一年二月八日ノトントル條約及一九三一年四月二日ノトトル條約規定ニ基る日本、合衆國及英國ハ海軍建造二國之ノト報告ヲ文陳シ居、日本が右條約終結セシムに由ルテノトトル條約規定ニ依テ東洋廿一年半至リシ時日本ハ一九三一年ニ廣田外務大臣及外相大隈由三支拂シテ文書を念のう諸通牒ニ付テ海軍建造二國之相互情報交換ノルナ米英及佛提言ヲ拒絶也。然ニ日本ハ後述ノ如事実復、他ノ方法ニ依リ合衆國迄ノ海軍建造二國又ニ兩大情報を得得、而アリ。

一〇、是れ海軍政策ノ第一段階ト、一九三一年四月二年間日本海軍及政府ハ航空母艦建造、擴張計画を實行セリ、一九三一年日本ハ航空母艦四隻又六八百四噸有之居、然ニ一九三一年十二月首即キ、僅僅カ五隻ニシテ日本ハ航空母艦、威力ヲ三倍以上増加シ空母十隻又六七百噸有之居、

一一、是れ、航空母艦建造、擴張ニ加ニ一九三一年ヨリ一九三二年三月内重巡洋艦ヲ一隻又ヨリ五隻又十隻又駆逐艦ヲ七十二隻又ヨリ百二十隻又二百零八艘水艦ヲ四隻又ヨリ七十隻又未だ增加セリ、同一期内米国ハ西洋ニ於テ海軍を擴大三百四十艘又重巡洋艦、艦隊十隻又日本上同様、十隻又ニタルカナル駆逐艦八三百三十隻又ヨリ百二十隻又縮少、又八艘水艦ハ八十隻又ヨリ百三十隻又增加セリ、航空母艦ヲ比較セバ一九三四年及一九三六年山本提督及水野、海軍大將が夫々が引用セシ如ク合議ニテ聲附セヒ時日本及合衆國海軍合名、四隻又八艘航空母艦ヲ有シ居、一九三一年十二月七日ハ日本八十隻又、航空母艦ヲ有シ居モ未包八僅カ二十六隻又ヲ有セシム、而エソ中太平洋アリハ僅カ、三隻又十九

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十一、航空母艦、~~建造及使用~~二月二日平海軍改備遂行、為三三三
最終段階八真珠灣攻擊事二於心內戰記錄上三十、空母不重
認為、日本二三一七軍人甲十、日本軍が真珠湾二對三十、派軍十七
大隻、航空母艦八加里士城、倉橋、能龍、翔鶴及瑞鶴二二
日本海軍中最強、空母十九、之三八日本海軍、空母兵力總下
之數、七制力令二七メ三百六十樣于出擊事日本軍艦石火烈火、日本
海軍全艦載兵力七制力令三相等、ノルマニ、當時ハワイ水域。
在二三隻、空母即半米巡洋艦二十、トウリーブラズ、真珠湾
三旋泊セヨン、合衆國海軍が集合、得タル艦載機、最大數八
百八十樣、ヨシカツハシヤマセハ一九三六年ヨリ一四年二月二日
海軍、空母遠征日本、ニテ被攻擊事海軍部隊三七、五個船二
優教十九艦載機兵力、伴ノ未だ着テ十九最強力、一様動認隊ヲ
搭載、真珠湾、合衆國海軍半萬三艦船、攻擊事、得
タヒト、更三右攻擊事二於心日本海軍、士タヒ目標及目的八真珠湾
ノ基地上ス、北米海軍、三隻、航空母艦、勝利次ソ、太行港、三三
日本空母既得、優化了、海軍也、トス、ナガト、

十二、二月二日、計
東及、準備八日本海軍最高權威者、外野、山本ヨリ、航空
母艦、優略的、海軍行、身、建造、ハ、海軍艦、ナタベキニ、
明示的認識、日本が空母於心、海軍事務委員會、開、心現存條約、制
限、廢棄セサヌ、日本二二、特此行、日本、海軍計画及、準備、
日本が一九四一年、合衆國、他、列、計、航空母艦、於、決定的優位、
当、心、五、建造、艦、アリ、而、三、最後、膨脹、侵略
、自指、海軍改備、復、日本、一九四一年、十一月、空母機動部隊、以
子、戰爭、事、會、行、日本、心、合衆國、海軍勢力、擴張セ、ナ、
討、西、二、空母、ノ、且、航行、於、艦隊、行、

第二頁

委任統治諸島於ハ海軍基地設定及
要塞構築開港計畫並準備

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四、茲提出七二六書證「委任統治諸島」對日本海軍攻撃日本海軍，
航空母艦封入政等關上同様目的即、上等委任統治諸
島海軍擴張及侵略島嶼開發且利用其上之特色附于本允
下示七十。

五、上同様右政東實行方航空母艦開港以策實行附執レクル
上同一活動線沿テ馬サウジ即一條約二諸制限終止符打リ之
本件場合直接條約後記(二)當該諸島要塞及海軍基地築造
(三)右諸島要塞及基地一九四年(昭和十六年)十月廿日及以後
合衆國及同盟國對ハ海軍戰闘行為開始並遂行焉使用。
六、條約及委任統治制限(一)第一二條約(一九〇年)(右條約基日
本與ニル化統治委任(三)合衆國・日本間委任統治條約(一九三三年)
依宣立セラ出走(二)等制限(次如述ニテ)、
當該委任統治諸島領域ハ海軍基地設定若ハ要塞
構築スベシト

(次頁續)

No. 8

一七、日本海軍及政府が委任統治諸島海軍基地設立ノ件事実ヲ
平成文書（歴史文書）備添ノ期ニシテ所適切ナリモナリ、理由引
き、中々ノ提出来ス。該文書即ち日本海軍聯合艦隊
命^令第^二号（國際檢察部文書第^{十七}号）ナリ

一八、聯合艦隊司令長官山本大將軍 命令^{一九四一年/昭和十六年}
十一月五日旗艦長内ヨリ發セ。〔國際檢察部文書第七号之頁〕
右ノ件米英蘭戰爭於ケル聯合艦隊作戰別冊係り之ヲ
実施スナリ命令^{十一}ナリ。

ソ、別冊本文及圖表共百五十二頁ト、眞珠灣攻撃
ノ二、三頁三船尾戰爭作戰大綱ヲ掲ゲ、戰爭準備
通信補給、兵力、配置ノ他、諸事項規定シアリ。

一九、委任統治諸島^ノ命令^{各附二頁}ノ^ノ文書^ノ真^ノ於^ノ該
命令補給基地、割当^ヲ定シアリ、南洋部隊及支那^遠部
隊二割當^ヲラシタル補給基地及、委任統治諸島ナリ
、サイパン、エミリヤ、オランダ、マニラ、タロウ、トラック、ボル
及、パラオ、コロ等、^ノ基地^ス、割当^ヲラシタル全海軍補給
基地半數以上^ヲ占メア。即^ク補給基地総數六十五ナリ

二〇、^ノ文書^ノ真^ノ附表^{二二}ノ^ノ補給基地^ノ化最
初燃料供給量相^ノ前記八委任統治諸島中五島
三對^ノ汽鑊油、供給量^ノ總計四万六千五百公噸^{ナリ}。
同様^ノ委任統治領基地三對^ノ多量、航空爆彈、機
関銃彈藥、魚雷及^ノ設置水雷^ガ割当^シアリ。八委任統治
領基地三對^ノ一月^付十三萬五千人食、糧食^ガ割
当^シアリ。ノ^ノ文書^ノ真^ノ六莫太九每月補充供
給數量^ガ委示^シアリ。南洋地域^ノ航空機資
材^ノ補充ハ^トラシ^ク自^ノ行^シ、^ノ水陸資^ノ物^ノ補

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一、先づヨセリ「眞於ヲ爲サルコトセラシア」
二、命令者号ガシ等委任統治領、施設就キ基地ト言フ事
葉ヲ用ヒテハ絶シモア正確ナリ。之ニ關聯スハ資材、數量
及地域、狀況ハシ等海軍基地及在基地於ケル貯藏、輸送、
通信及航路等、爲施設が大規模且長期同ニ亘リ
建設セラシタルモナルコト示シアリ。ノ東ニ就キ他書類
想提出且検討ヲ蒙ア得ル如ナシアリ。

三、參従統治諸島之命令者号於兵力、配置示入表中
天皇令(三)御一五、一〇六頁)中艦隊實質參従統治領艦
隊(呼バハ)を中心とした南洋部隊(以下、艦隊集合地トシ
テ南洋即ち參従統治諸島ヲ當テラシアリ。右部隊隊八
コシ等、基地ヨリ活動ヨ起ニシ珠珍湾攻撃部隊掩
護ニシテ之助久能限リ迅速ニシテイク及ガム攻撃
シ且該攻撃部隊ト要地攻略ヤシタ協力スベリ命
セラシアリ。更ニ參従統治領之基地ヲ有スモノニ通商破
壊部隊アリ又ハ明ラク右命令ニヨリ海上交通破壊ヲ
擔當セラシタル潛水艦部隊ナリ。潜水艦隊及他
諸艦隊ニ屬ス日本、潛水艦常ニ參従統治領、諸
基地ヨリ利用セリ、日本ヨリシ珠珍湾へ途次潜水艦ハ
三、ノミセリ。島=待機シタナリ。

四、右如クニシテ、日本海軍が九四一年(昭和六年十二
月一日以前)於參従統治諸島ニ於ケル海軍基地
ヲ既ニ建設シタルコト明瞭ナリ
之上同様ニ日本海軍及政府が參従統治諸島ニ要
塞構築セラコト示入數多(文書アリ)、簡潔ヲ
期不爲、三種(文書ヨリ成ニ連)證據、三ヲ提

本文書、中二冊（國際検察部六二五四号-A 及
六二五四号-B）ハ、一九四三年、昭和十七年、八月即ち戦争
開始後方月余アリ、其時合衆國海軍寫真情報部
隊ニヨリ撮影セラシタル、ウオルナット島、空中偵察寫真チ
リオミス書、國際検察部文書六二五四号-C、
一九四〇年、昭和十五年、八月十日、日附、アル、ウオルナット
島、日本、青写真地図ニテ、一九四四年、昭和十九年、
アリカ軍ガクニゼリ、島上陸セル際、圖獲セバモナ。
二五、之等、寫真調べテ見ルトクシナエ、一九四二年七月更
ノ、昭和七年、八月三十日ヨリ前、要塞化シ島、要塞テ
アル上共、海軍、基地ヲ兼ネタル装備施設サシタモノチ
ハ、トトガ分也。青写真地図テ、一九四〇年、昭和五年八月
ヨリ前、日本、海軍政府、既、左記ナル要塞化施設タ
トガ分也。ウラジオーリケル日本軍、施設、大キサ、各文書添
附シテアル各項自然、対照、未示サシテ居也。
二六、寫真シ一三、カラシゲ、島北端、部、國際検察部文書六
六二五四号-A、島中央飛行場、又不鋪裝滑走路
一本、カルコトが分也。其滑走路、各三百呎幅アリ、一哩
以上、長サ一五七。呎、今シハ三九。呎、長サアリ、小型飛
行機、勿論、陸地、基地不大型爆撃機用、適
中也。二個又、三個、大格納庫、二個、大キナ工場風、建物
ガ滑走路、西ニ是エテ居也。之等格納庫、北ニ大キナ木上貯
飛行機入斜道ガアリ、其處、幅一五。呎、長サ三。呎、往
ト思心、量太木上飛行機、過格納庫ガアル。
二七、多ク、備砲、位置が見テ、其中二北側、南側、三
門、敷置、対空上海岸防衛、両目的ヲ持ツ砲臺ガア

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其、名々ハ直グ傍ニ動力庫、軍需品庫、司令塔及兵舍地
域ヲ持ツテ居ル。砲八九分五吋若クヘテ砲アラウ、寫眞ト地圖
ノ中ニ瀕近ニ沿テ多數ノ框合ガ見ラシル。

二八、重油貯藏「タンク」ト彈藥貯藏用建物ト日本製地圖
(中ニ文字ニヨリナサレテ居ル。而シテ又寫眞デハ濛々タク黒
烟ヨリ米國海軍飛行隊ガ目標トシタ其等ノタンク) 及彈
藥庫、位置ヲ示シテ居ル。

二九、塹壕、鉄筋コンクリート掩蔽砲床、機関銃座、鐵條網、
道路、連絡橋式及總數五十以上、建物モ亦寫眞ト地圖上
デ看取スルコトが出来ル。

三〇、寫眞シ一ミ(國際検察部文書ニ五四号、B) デハ大
キニ階建無電送信所、建物が見ラレ其ノ横ニハニツ
無電塔ガアリ其ノ他ノ建物ヤ、タンク、モアル。

三一、一九四〇年(昭和十五年)八月十日附、此ノ日本製地圖
及一九四一年(昭和十七年)八月三十日作成、之等ノ空
中寫眞ニテサレタル「ワツヅギエニ」於ケル施設、總テ重量カラ
見ルト日本海軍ト政府トハソクモ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)
一半年前カラ恐ラクハ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)ト一九四一年
(昭和十六年)トノ全期間ヲ通ジ基地、設置及要塞構
築ニ從事シテ居タコトハ明カデアル。此ノ貯ニ南スル証據、
追加トシテ本件ノ他ノ部門ニ於テ日本人ノ為ニ「ワツヅギエニ」
於テ建設工事ニ働イタ該島嶼ノ住民カラ申立ノ形式デ
後日提出サル由ニ聞イテ居ル。

機密

三二、日本海軍ニ依リ作成セラシタル文書即チ、聯合艦隊
命令、作才一號及、ウツヅギエニ、地圖ハ日本ノ海軍及
政府ガ一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月七日以前ニ海軍

基地ヲ設置シ且要塞ヲ構築シトヲ明ニシテ居心モ、上思ひ心。

六二五九
第 三 項

(二十一)

三三、海軍攻撃等援助上、領事館同謀行動実況計画及準備
多々文書上記録上、日本海軍及政府殊外務省が
一九三三年(昭和六年)から一九四一年(昭和十六年)向米
國海軍及政府三元海軍、施設及活動三國監視踏査及
向謀政策取扱い凡てヨリ示す所。上思ひ心。

三四、米國海軍、真珠湾攻撃事件検査向会見事實中
日本向謀利度全世界、其民間人領事及外交官夕國
民利用三元米國海軍建艦計畫及米國海軍艦船、
位置及び動向等日本情報得セシテ居る述べ居心。

三五、日本海軍及政府殊外務省、指揮、下底凡且連續的尙
謀分化、於總領事GAOベトナム多永男及全員
三敵化言人領事倉員ヨリ行ひタ。二十一日

三六、本同謀、性格及範囲、真珠湾攻撃大貢献、
コトヨリ文書不文書不提出不之等文書日本總領
事館東京、日本海軍及外務省、同文換サシタル通信
中數回、石證アル寫テアリ其通信私設電信会
社、テヨリ暗号ヨリモナガル。

（國際檢察部文書六二五五号）A.C.D.E.F.G.H.I.J.K.L.M.N.O.P.Q.R.S.T.U.V.W.X.Y.Z.

三七、之等通信中、真珠湾内場所十地域ヲ指示する居心案
ヨリ了解、其ノ為、真珠湾、海図用意シタる、
シヨリ又今提出不コトスル、（國際檢察部文書
六二五八号）

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三八最初、電報(國際檢察部、文書オ六ニ五五一A号)

日本文電報オハ三号)ハ東京ヨリノモノニシテ其ノ中ニ
外務大臣豊田海軍大將、氏名記載シアルヲ以テ
外務省ヨリ發セテレタルモナルコト明カナリ。次、如シ。

「東京(豊田)ヨリ」

「ホノルル」へ

一九四一年/昭和十六年/九月二十四日

ハ三番 極秘

以後船舶ニ因シ出来ルタケ次、範圍ニ沿フテ御報告

ヲ望ム

1. 水域(眞珠灣内)ハ大体五ツノ水域ニ区切ラレル
コト(省略ハ全然差支ヘナシ)

水域A「オード」島ト工廠同、水域。

水域B「ラオード」島南部及ビ西部、島ニ近接セル

水域、(コノ水域ハ「水域A」ヨリ島側ニ向ツテ反対
ニル)

水域C 東入江

水域D 中央入江

水域E 西入江及之ニ通ズル水路。

2. 戰艦及航空母艦ニ因シテハ碇泊中ノモノ(之等ハ
左程重要ナラカルモノ)埠頭、浮標及船渠ニ繫留
中ノモノニ付報告サレタシ。(簡潔ニ型及等級ヲ
指示スルコト、出来得レバニ隻又ハ其レ以上、艦
船が同一埠頭ニ碇泊シアル場合ハ之ヲ指摘サタシ
陸軍 二三二六〇号)

翻訳 一九四一年/昭和十六年/九月十日

(5)

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三九

次、電文(國際檢察部文書第大二五五一〇号)

日本電文第二一号一ハ東京發ノモノニシテ、東卿
外務大臣、氏名アルヲ以テ之モ本外務省ヨリノ電
文在コト明瞭ナリ。電文次、如シ。

「東京(東卿)ヨリ

「木ノルル」(領事)宛

一九四一年、昭和十六年、十一月十五日

第一二二号

日米關係ハ最モ危機ニ瀕シテ居ルタメ貴方、在港
中ノ船舶ヲシテ一週ニ二度、割合ニテ不規則的ニ
報告セシメラレタシ。勿論貴方ニ於テモ既ニ氣付
カレシ事トハ思フが秘密ヲ保持スルニ特別ノ注意
ヲ拂ハレタシ。

ノロ一、六九九一

二五六四

一九四一年、昭和十六年、三月十三日

四〇、海軍、諭訣一二一三一四一(S)

(西夏)

日本電文第二二二号ハ日本總領事ガ真珠湾
攻撃ニ先立ツ一ヶ月足ラズ前ニ東京ニ向テ登信
シリタル通報、形式ヲ示ス。次、如シ。

「木ノルル」(喜多)發

東京宛

一九四一年、昭和十六年、十一月十八日

第二二二号

一十五日、湾内ニ投錨中ノ軍艦八隻、日附余ノ二九号
ニテ報告、通リ

No. 15

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A 水域 オフホノ級駆逐艦 八港油槽船 一隻出港
C 水域 重巡級三隻投錨中
六十七日サヨウガシ港内二十。航空母艦 エンタープライズ
又ス其他、艦船一隻 C 水域ニアリシカニ級
重巡二隻ペソサヨウ、巡洋艦 K5 ドック 繫留中。
商船四隻日本水城ニ投錨中。
三十七日朝午前十時駆逐艦八隻湾へ入港シテ
了山ヲ目撃セラタリ。ソ、追路次ノ如ク。
千米内隔一列時速三、ツトテ真珠港ヘリタリ。
同港入口右日本水城ヲ経テ C 水域、深水三繫留セラ
レタリ。同艦八各回大凡三。度々、五回追路ノ機会有り。
経過時間一時間、併シ是等駆逐艦、ツチ一隻ハ
東側貯水池ヲ經日本水城ヘリタリ
一轉舵セリ。

陸軍二五八七 一九四一年昭和十六年六月十三日

能談(2)

四、一次、電文(國際檢察部)文書六二五五、正号(三立通)
日本電文第一三号ハ真珠灣攻撃事ハスル重要花
三個、予備問題ヲ提起モナリ、此電文モ前同
様、東郷外相氏名記載シアリ。
之ヲ以テ日本外務省ト日本海軍トハ、密接干渉
連絡アリシコトヲ示ス。次、如ク。
軍令施設艦船動向其他一聞スル日本、通報(二更)
東京(東郷)
木丸、定一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月二日
昭和十六年十二月三十日陸軍ヨリ能談

五十九

第一二三号(省外機密)

現状ニ鑑ミ戰艦航空母艦巡洋艦港内破泊ハ極メテ
重要ナリコトナリ爾今著下ハ最善ヲサシア逐一余
ニ知ラシムヨウ珠灣上空ニ觀測用氣球、リヤナリ若
シクハ該氣球、上昇セラルハ十微候ノ未何事カ、
動向アリヤ否ヨタキ、場合ニキ余ニ而信セヨ
亦上記戰艦ハ火機電網ヲ準備シアカ否アフ
報知セヨ

(キニシ)自白書ヲ提出)

一三六頁

四、前在日本電文第一二三号、發セラシタト同日即ナ
一九四一年昭和十六年十二月二日二八一トド、
シユリアス、オノ、キニシハ、彼が證言上テ提出
出シタル自白書(國際檢察部文書參照)第六五六
A及びBニ據ヒバ、妻多總領事及其部下
ニ對シ示化シ、總領事館ニ於テ總領事、妻多
シタル情報報文書トテ交シタリ。但、自供スル
處ニシハ、キニシハ明カニ一万弾ヲ下サル相當な
金額ヲ支拂ハシタリ。又ハ日本總領事、対ソ從軍
又日本海軍、東京、外務省ニ對ソル、情報ヲ探
候シタルヨリアリ。キニシハ千セシタル情報報
及ビ文書ハ在港中、米國艦艇ニ賣シ、港内ニ於
ケル破泊場所ヲ示ス、外極メテ明細ニ記述ガ
アリ、又更ニ信号用、包括的符号等モアリタ。
此、信号傳以テ真珠灣向ケ航行途上、日本軍
潛水艦又ハ日本軍海軍部隊ニ上速、此中情報ヲ

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通報之得失七十。

四三、十二月三日善多總領事、受領セガツニ金ノ
通語的二支艦也。日本ノ暗号ハ、本船ノヨリ正
シ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月三日附、通信ヲ以テ
東京ニ傳達セリ。通信文ニ述べル如ヘイ、海軍
在航ビテカクミ在十八年十二月、告白ニ依レバ彼等
アリシ家ナリ矣。本通信文（國際檢定部書類
十六三五号、下、日本通信文第百五号）

八左如。

四四、不化心善多號 Honolulu (Kita)

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月三日（一九四一年（昭和十六年）
十二月十一日海軍報）

（P A I C 二）

第一四五号（一部二ア完成）

（軍令部報）

一、富士一即刻陸軍參謀本部第三課長宛
一、余ハ暗号ヨリ通信方法ヲ次、如ノ様入スルトヲ
希望ス。

（）八箇暗号ヲ次、三行配列入

意味

偵察艦及商船部隊 官幹事連備中 暗号

（）空戦闘艦分隊

數隻航空母艦 官幹事連備中 1.

駆逐艦分隊 一日三日、同全部出發 2.

航空母艦 一月三日向敵襲入港 3.

（）

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航 空 母 艦	百 三 二 日 向 三 金 部 出 港	8 7 6 5
航 空 母 艦	百 三 二 日 向 三 金 部 出 港	8 7 6 5
航 空 母 艦	四 三 一 大 曾 二 日 向 三 勝 入 港	8 7 6 5
航 空 母 艦	四 三 一 大 曾 一 日 向 二 金 部 出 港	8 7 6 5
(2) 暗号		
[1] 7 = 乃 1 洲	Lanifai 海濱家屋 八夜同 次如 7 燐入()	

(=)	一燈	午后八時ヨリ九時	8
" "	"	午后九時ヨリ十時	7
" "	"	午后十時ヨリ十一時	6
" "	"	午后十時ヨリ十二時	5
=	二燈	十二時ヨリ午前一時	4
" "	"	午前一時ヨリ二時	3
" "	"	午前二時ヨリ三時	2
" "	"	午前三時ヨリ四時	1

第二部

(三) 「ラニカイ」 Lanikai 湾 売間
ヨット (star boat) 帆上部 一ツ / 星 ; 附シタ場合
之ハ暗号 1. 2. 3. 若 4. 4 フラ不ス 若 一ツ / 星 +
口 1. 2. 數字 3 フラ附シタ場合ハ暗号 5. 6. 7. 若 8.
8 フラ示ス

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時
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時
時

暗号
3若々 6
4若々 7
5若々 8

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四五、更に外務大臣、如ニ於テ想云甚るを要する處、
總領事ハ次、口通信ヲ送ル。本通信が其後眞珠湾
空襲キテ、日本艦隊二艘沈没電告シテ八疑ナシ。
一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月五日付、本通信(國際檢察
部書類中六三五号)、日本通信文(三五二号)左

木化ハ發 Honolulu

東京砲

一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月五日(一九四一年十二月十日海
軍次)

(P A K 2)

二三五号

(一) 五月金曜日午前、余、通報、號二三九三於飭送、
三戰艦當地ニ到着日。 七月八日南洋二店

ノモト。

(三)(二) ハリントン/Lexington/五隻、五重巡[同日出港セ]。
左記艦船八、九日午後魂内二下。

戰艦
輕巡
駆逐艦

三八隻
十隻

木化ハ Honolulu / 級、四艦並二八船渠

才レリ。

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四六、「ホルル」發、東京宛、十二月六日附、通信ハ「通信、述べ年
ル「奇襲」ニ関スル直接的情報ヲ提供スルモノニシテ且ツ
防空網及ニ氷雷防禦網ナル重要問題ヲ扱与リ、本通
信文（國際檢察部書類番号五五九、H、日本通信文書
五三号）ハ左一如レ、

「ホルル」/ Honolulu / 發

東京 宛

一九四一年/昭和十六年一/十二月六日(一九四一年十二月八日
陸軍訣)

P.A.I.K.2

オニヌ三號

貴方一二三號、最後、部分ニ関シ

米國方陸二於テ十月ニ陸軍ハ「ノース・キャロライナ」

North Carolina / 「テジニア島」/ 兵舎ニテ防空
網部隊、訓練ヲ開始セリ。彼等ハ四百、氣球ヲ往
向シタミナラズ「ハワイ」/ Hawaii / 及ビ「ペナイン」/

Panama / 防禦ニコレガ氣球ヲ使用セシ考慮、ヒカルミ
ト思ル。ハワイ / Hawaii / 南アフリカ真珠湾
附近、調査が行ハレタルガ、彼等ハ真珠湾施設モ為サ
ズ又ソシラニ配貢スベキ部隊、堅定モ、為シオズ。
更ニ氣球保持、訓練ガ何等カ、企テラレオルか如キ微候
更ニナシ。現在ノトヨ、防空網施設、形跡ナシ。更ニ彼等
が實際、防空網施設ト構スルモノ持ナ居ルト考フルト
困難ナリ。乍然、彼等ハ真珠湾「ヒツカヒ」/ Hickam /

No. 22

No. 23

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ノゾミ上 / Yard / 五二四 / End / 附近、空港、
水上車上用走路、上空ノ制空バタフライ実際準備
ヲナシテノト難工、眞珠湾、氣球防禦二限界アリ。余ハ
ヨコハマ場所ニ付シ奇襲文化為ニ利用之機会アリ。本日
當爲サムライ化ノト考アセラ。

二、余見解ノ人、己等戰艦八隻、雷網十枚。
詳細不明。尙余調査、結果ヲ報セ。

四七、改讐、前夜、日本公使領事、眞珠湾ニ泊、又、繫留
中、船舶二隻、通信ヲ東京ニ發セ。通信ノ國際
検察部、書類ヤ六五五号、工日本通信才三四号
ニテ改訛セし。

「木」化ハ發

東京向

一九四一年/昭和十六年/十月六日(一九四一年十二月八日
軍令依)解説(ル)

P A | K 2

廿二四編

1. 五月夕刻、八隻軍艦、中二隻、及潜水
母艦一隻アリ。次、船舶八六日、横濱沖十アマ
メキ。

戰艦九隻、輕巡洋艦三隻、潛水母艦三隻、
駆逐艦十七隻、更ニ加ルニ 輕巡洋艦四隻、
駆逐艦三隻が認メル。〔重巡洋艦及航空母
艦八八八、出港〕

2. 駆逐艦、航空部隊(空母)空母ノ偵察、行マリノ模様
ナシ。

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四、日本、米、英及ソ連軍三國は、二、三種の書類、
示化して於ける領事情報團化を、少數に限定せ
り。日本海軍及外務省が、領事平野報と眞珠湾攻
撃、補助上計画の実施を行爲、侵略戦争準備
爲め、他行爲上同様化するべし。

中四項

(三三頁)

日本側より合衆国に対する日本合衆軍、軍艦用船入
口云々明白化、而シテ道理甚矣哉故告之前以了通告
大正元年(昭和六年)十二月七日、ワイ眞珠湾
三、合衆國海軍兵員及艦船三対ミナスハ、日本
空母機動部隊三機突撃攻撃、計画上準備
五、航空母艦建造委委任統合員は於ける海軍機動部隊
及要塞建設團の日本海軍、計画及準備
準備、既に進歩セリ。海軍、本體を準備上ア、合衆
了偵察行動、日本海軍、計画及準備
天、考観慮拂へ、航空母艦及要塞化カリ島嶼基
地並探知報告用ヒル、眞珠湾攻撃團以上、
計画完成セラヨ次ニ示入。

五一、本攻撃手引ノ目的、(2)計画(3)遂行、諸事目、
考観慮入。

五二、攻撃手引、分析二用ヒル書類、合上二
(1)機密聯合艦隊命令合作方書(國際検察部書
類本一七号)
(2)聯合軍最高司令官、聯合空軍、飛行、通報部
調査報告三号、九四五五年(昭和二十年)八月一日附

1900. 6. 25. 1

No. 1

五三.

(1) 日本、戰爭次第、ト題入書類
〔國際檢察部書類第十六二八号〕及
(2) (眞珠灣作戰、是不向敵所、以後 AT S 呼) (三頁)
ヨリ得化調査報告第十三号〔國際檢察部書類
第十六二七号〕
述べラシタリ。
(1) 英洋作戰(其島子含ム)二村入行動、自由ヲ確保
シ且ア勝利的餘裕ヲ得ル為、合衆國太平洋艦隊
(2) ヲ無力化ニ
併テ我委任統治諸島、防衛ヲ期セトス。

〔國際檢察部書類
第十六二八号、六六頁〕

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五四.

聯合艦隊參謀長伊藤大尉次、通り(言明セリ)
即ク眞珠灣、艦隊ノ開戦最初一擊、完全ニ粉
碎セラバヘシ。若ニ亞利哥加が準備不充分、向ニ
艦隊ニテ、重要支那ヲ攻撃す反し、回答取入事ヨリ
開戦頭初ニ至々、戰果の西朝権ヲ確保スナラバ御
悔、作戰、規模ヲ有利支配ニ得ベシ(國際檢察
部書類第十六二七号 P. 七、八、
機密聯合艦隊命令作成第1号、七八頁
〔國際檢察部書類第十七号〕、中ニ日本、全
作戰、一般目的が次、如ク述べラシアリ)。

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- 一 東方ニ対しテ、米國艦隊ヲ擊破シ且、東洋ニ対スル英國ノ作戦線及び補給線ヲ遮断ス。
- 二 西方ニ対しテ、英領馬來方面ヲ攻略シ、美國、東洋ニ対ヘル作戦線、補給線及「ビルマート」ヲ遮断ス。
- 三 在東洋敵兵カラ擊滅シ、其、作戦據点ヲ奪フト
其ニ、資源地帯ヲ獲得ス。
- 四 要地ヲ攻略開發、防備ヲ強化シテ、持久作戦態勢ヲ確保ス。
- 五 敵兵カラ敵撃、擊滅ス。
- 六 戰果ヲ擴大シ、敵、戦意ヲ奪フ
- 五、二 永野(云フ處ニ依ル)眞珠湾攻撃、計画ハ、一九四一年(昭和十六年)一月初旬、山本ニ依リテ想見セリ。
一九四一年(昭和十六年)九月ヨリ作戦參謀將校ニ依リ、立栗サヒタルモノナリ。(國際檢察部書類)中一六八
号(二六頁)前以テ全計画ヲ承知し居リタル日本海軍
軍人十六人、永野及正本アリ。計画、一部ヲ知り居
クル者三、海軍大臣、島田海軍大將及、海軍少將
局長岡海軍大將アリ。(同二六頁)該計画、仕上
備ヘ(一九四一年)昭和十六年九月二日ヨリ、十三日ニ至ル
ニテ、東京ニ於テ戰爭圖上作戦演習ヲ催セリ。約
四十人、重要な日本海軍將校少足ニ參加シ永野が
最上位、將校トシテ審判ヲ勤メタリ。

(同四、カ、六頁)

五六

該計画、準備ニ參画セル日本海軍將校ニ依レバ解決スベキ問題ハ如何ニシテ最モ有効ニ布哇方面、合衆國太平洋艦隊ヲ攻撃スベキニアリタリ。

彼等ハ次、如ク述ベ居テ、即チ布哇方面ニ於ケル合衆國太平洋艦隊、主力ヲ最モ効果的ニ無力化セシムニハ碇泊艦ヲ雷撃スルニアリト決定セラレタリ。此ノ故ニ次、ミツノ障碍ヲ考慮セリ。

(a)

真珠灣ノ狹隘ニシテ、威海面ナルヲ東

(b)

真珠灣ノ多分魚雷防禦網ヲ裝備シアルベキコト

(c)

(a) 項ニ對ニテハ魚雷ニ安定器ヲ附シソレヲ超低高

(d)

度發射スルコトヲ計画セリ。

用セリ。

五七

次、問題ハ燃料補給ト奇襲遂行トデアリ。是等、
莫二付キ同將校等ハ次、如ク述ベタ。(同六十八頁)
即チ燃料補給、能力ト奇襲トハ何レモ本作戦、
鍵ニシテ何レタクト雖モ作戦遂行ハ不可能
ナリ」ト

洋上、燃料補給ハソノ遂行ニ独特、訓練ヲ要スル
モアツク、奇襲ヲ確實ニスル為、船舶ノ往來ノ少ナ
イ北方大洋航路を取ラシナケレバナラヌシ、並衛牽
制偵察駆逐艦が先航セセラレネバナラズ、又洋上
ニ於イテハ完全ナ「ラジオ」、停止が更に施サレバナラ
ズ、他方瀬戸内海及ビ九州地域ニ於テ欺瞞的
「ラジオ」活動を行ハナケレバナカツ。(同六十八頁)

五八、南雲提督麾下、而ミテ六隻ノ航空母艦ヨリ

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成)、二隻、駁船二隻、重巡洋艦一隻、輕巡洋艦
二隻、駆逐艦三隻、潛水艦及已八隻、海軍巡
船二隻、掩護艦二隻、空母機動部隊編成ヲノ、計
画ハ詳細ニ規定シテ、下アツク。(同八十三頁) 但知部
隊ハ普通、潛水艦及已特別訓練ヲ受ケタ將校か
末組ニゲ豆潛水艇、兩者、潛水艦ヲ合シテ共ク、
(同七十八頁) 國際檢察部文書ガ十六百二十七号、
(七十二三頁) 室母機載攻擊機八三百六十機テア
ツメ即ナ急降下爆擊機百三十五機、水平爆擊
機百四機、雷擊機四十機及已八十一機、地三銳擊機
テアシテ、攻擊目標、主トニア航空母艦、空軍基地及
地上ニアル航空機ニ定ムラシテ居ツク、然シ遂行ニ除シ
航空母艦が居ナリシテ、下戰艦が特別ナシ注意ヲ要
ケタ、アシテ、國際檢察部文書ガ十六百二十八号、
(八十四頁)

三九ノ、計画ハ又各所ニ於ケテヨリ劣勢十艦隊、活動
ヲ規定シタ、アツク。(國際檢察部文書ガ十七号二
八。四一六頁)

六。真珠灣攻撃ニ對スル本計画ニ於ケモ又海軍記録中
、如何ナシ他、日本文書中ニモ松八立案者が攻撃者、
警告ヲ要求スル才三回海牙條約、通用乃至不適用
用ニ付ケテ何等カ、考慮ヲ拂ヒタリナフ何等、證
跡ヲ認メナシ、テアリ。

六、計画、遂行

一九四一年、昭和十六年、十一月五日、永野海軍大將、山
本提督ニ對シ命令ヲ發セリ(國際檢察部文書

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十六百三十一年七月十五日)」山本八(國際検察部文書第十七)、^{ノルマニ}基十即日山本八(國際檢察部文書第十七)、^{ノルマニ}聯合艦隊命令第一号ヲ發し、該計畫ヲ実行セリ。

計画ニ於ケルY日ヲ而ミテ後ニX日ヲ(同月三日)決定スル為メ、規定ニ從ニ十三月八日ヲY日ニ決定セラ命令サニ号(同二月五日)ヲ十一月六日ニ山本八發セリ。

六二、同日一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月七日山本八旗艦長内ヨリ機動部隊ニ对于千島擇捉島、^{ヒトカツア}軍艦灣ニ集結十一月三十二日迄=物資、補給ヲスベキ旨、命令ヲ發セリ(國際檢察部文書第十六百二十八年七月十七日)

六三、十一月二十五日山本八機動部隊ニ十一月二十六日行動ヲ起シ而ミテ十一月三日トキメテ夜行待機位置ニ其、行動ヲ秘匿シツツ進発セリ上命セリ(國際檢察部文書第十六百二十八年七月十八日)

六四、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月二十六日午前六時機動部隊ハ真珠灣へ三十哩以上、航海、途ニ就ケリ(同七十八日)

六五、十二月二日航海、途次機動部隊ハノルマニ(真珠灣時間十二月七日)ナリベキ旨、聯合艦隊命令ヲ接受セリ(同七十八日)

六六、十二月二日山本提督ハ、旗艦大和ヨリ攻撃開始、命令ヲ發セリ。

六七、十二月六日ヨリ七日、夜間(真珠灣時間)機動部隊ハ全速力(三十六節)ニテ南方へ突入セリ。

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六八 十二月六日早晩(真珠灣時間)オアフ島、真北二百三十
哩ニ至リシ時、午前一時三十分、航空母艦ハオ一次攻撃
隊、航空機ヲ進発セシメタリ。オアフ島、北方二百哩
時、午前二時四十五分オニ次攻撃隊、航空機ヲ進
航空機ハ航空母艦、南方ニ集合シ攻撃、タメ進発
セリ。雷撃機及び急降下爆撃機ハ午前七時五十五
分ヨリ八時二十五分マテ攻撃セリ。水平爆撃機ハ八時
四十分ヨリ九時十五分マテ續キタル攻撃ニ於ケル主要
攻撃機ナリ。急降下爆撃機ハ九時十五分ヨリ九時
四十五分マテ攻撃セリ。時ニ襲撃ハ終アセリ。

六九 機動部隊ハ航空機ヲ進発セシタル後全速力ア
テ北西ニ向ケ後退セリ。ソニテ午前十時半ヨリ、
午後一時半エテ、南ニ約廿八機ヲ除ク以外、飛行
機全部母艦ニ帰還セタリ。依テ本機動部隊ハ
吳向ケ進發シ十二月廿三日同地ニ到着セリ。

七十 本攻撃部隊ハ米海軍將校並ニ兵員一九九九名ヲ
殺害セリ。其際オ一戦艦戦隊司令官タルアイザック
キヤーベル、キッド少将戰死セリ。恐ラク彼ハ最後マテ
指揮ヲ取り居タル旗艦アリゾナ、爆発ニ際シ戰死せん
モノト推定セラル。アリゾナニ於ケル全損害ハ將校四七
兵員一〇五六(一九四六年、昭和三十一年、七月十五日附海
軍省人子弟局長証明)、合衆國海兵隊員、損
害死者一〇九名(一九四六年、昭和二十一年、五月七日海
兵隊人子弟長証明)、合衆國陸軍損失死者
三四名(一九四六年、昭和二十一年、七月八日附陸軍省

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七

損害調査局支那証明) 本攻撃ニ依ル一般市民、死者五四名(一九三六年昭和三十一年六月七日附布嗟太學内戦争記録局中部太平洋陸軍民情調査隊特別代理人報告)

飛行機損失合衆二一八八 日本二九
合衆ニ受ケタル大破並ニ損失 戰闘艦八 軽巡洋艦三 駆逐艦三 其他 船舶四 ニ二テ
日本側損失潛水艦三

此如ク不釣合ナル損害ヲ與ヘ得タルハ如何ニ
永野 山本及ビ日本海軍及政府 協力者カ
一九三一年 昭和六年 ヨリ 一九四一年 昭和十六年/
ニ至ル間ヨク其秘密ヲ守リ海軍ノ奇襲計画ト
準備トヲ為シ遂グルコトニ成功シ一九四一年 昭和十六
年十二月七日ヲ以テ其ノ見マナル計画ト準備
ノ絶頂ニ到達セシメタルユトヲ 物語ル

七三 真珠湾攻撃ヲ成功セシムル為ニハ偏ニ秘密、嚴
守ト完全ナル奇襲ニ依ラサル可カラサルコトヲ命
令其ノ他ニ於ニ操近シ強カニ警告シ遂ニ永
野 山本及ビ其協力者ハ眞珠湾攻撃ニ於ケル
完全ナル秘密、嚴守ト完全ナル奇襲、敢行ニ成
功ミタリ。

予ハ合衆ニ政府、記録中ニ日本政府ナ合衆ニ對シ
戦争行為ヲ開始セントスルコトニ就キテ豫メ明瞭ニ理
由アル警告ヲ與ヘタルガ如キ文書又ハ通信ノアリシ
コトヲ今迄發見シ得ズ。

日本外務省ヨリ日本ト合衆國トノ間ニ「戦争狀態」

No. 31

七四

No. 32

Doc 552

發生セリ」ト、通告が一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月廿
午前二時五十五分、総務省ニ到着セリ
即ち日本艦載機カラ、最初魚雷及爆弾が具珠
湾ヲ見舞テヨリ正二三時間四十分後、廿十一

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正誤表

	頁	行	誤	正
日本文	2	7	コトナシ	コトナシニ
"	2	13	擴脹	擴張
"	5	16-7	-諸=ナリ-	結ビテ…ハ=加ハル事
"	17	8	機電網	機電網
"	26	22	勧×	勧

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